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In recent years the impact of aid has been more favorably
viewed in the literature. One negative aspect, however, has
been aid volatility. Celasun and Walliser (2008) argue that
unexpected aid shortfalls can force governments to dispropor-
tionately cut investment, including in human capital, while aid
windfalls can disproportionately boost government consump-
tion. The issue is relatively new to the literature. Pallage and
Robe (2001) observed that aid is highly volatile with an aver-
age volatility of about 25% in African recipients and 29.5% in
nonAfrican recipients. But perhaps it was the work of Bulı´rˇ
and Hamann (2003, 2008) which had most early inﬂuence.
They argued that the volatility of aid is (i) greater than that
of government revenue, (ii) increasing over time, and (iii) pro-
cyclical (i.e., aid ﬂows are inversely correlated with the level of
government expenditures). Others have since built on and
modiﬁed their conclusions. For example, Hudson and Mosley
(2008a) ﬁnd that volatility as a whole reduces growth given the
level of aid, but not in a uniform way, diﬀerentiating between
upside and downside volatility.
The majority of this work focuses on the totality of aid and
its impact on key macroeconomic variables such as growth
and government expenditure. Indeed this is also the case with
the impact of aid itself. This is problematic. Why should
health aid promote growth as equally as infrastructure aid,
or vice versa with respect to targets such as infant mortality?
Why, too, should volatility in these two sectors have the same
impact? In this paper we seek to examine the nature of aid vol-
atility as it relates to speciﬁc aid sectors. The database we use
is the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) on the DAC
website. This gives detailed information on aid disbursements,
and, over a longer time, commitments, by 50 diﬀerent sectors
and subsectors. The data on the former are only available in a
reliable form since 2002, but on a panel data basis this is now
suﬃcient to allow meaningful analysis.
We are also interested in analyzing the impact of aid and aid
volatility on speciﬁc, and in some cases fairly narrow, targets.
Much of aid works not so much on the macroeconomy,
although there may, for example, be exchange rate eﬀects
and policy environment eﬀects for all aid, but rather on indi-
vidual aspects of the economy. The road built between A
and B facilitates trade between those two locations, a new hos-62pital in location C facilitates healthcare in that location. Aid
and aid volatility then impact on those projects, and, spillover
eﬀects apart, not on others. Now if there is a temporary switch
in aid from healthcare to secondary education, this will not
show up in the overall aid ﬁgures as volatility. The two will
cancel each other out. But the healthcare project will have suf-
fered from negative volatility and the education project from
positive volatility. Hence a knowledge and understanding of
aid sector volatility is important.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we
review the literature, after which we discuss methodological
and theoretical issues. Section 4 introduces the data. The
empirical analysis follows. In this, we ﬁrst decompose overall
volatility into its constituent, sector parts. We then analyze the
extent to which volatility is a dynamic process. Finally we
examine the impact of the diﬀerent aid sectors and associated
volatility, on selected “micro targets,” i.e., death rates, pri-
mary school completion rates, Internet usage, and mobile
phone subscriptions. We then conclude the paper.
Table 1 deﬁnes some key concepts and the measures of vol-
atility we make use of in this paper. We use several diﬀerent
measures of volatility as is appropriate to the purpose for
which it is being used. But, as is clear from the table, they
are all based on the same basic variable, the error term from
a trend regression.2. LITERATURE REVIEW
(a) Measuring aid volatility
The key initial work in this area is by Bulı´rˇ and Hamann
(2003, 2008). Their empirical work (ibid. 2008) is based on a
Table 1. Key Deﬁnitions and Measures of Volatility
Aid sector This is the sector, or subsector, at which the aid is identiﬁed. Examples include health and program assistance. The
term “sector” is the one employed on the CRS database. The diﬀerent aid sectors we use are deﬁned in the Appendix
Table. They are chosen to be a comprehensive summary of total aid and also to reﬂect important social and
productive sectors
Aid target This is the speciﬁc identiﬁable variable on which the aid is designed to impact. It could be literacy rates, Internet
usage, or at a local level, access to safe drinking water in a speciﬁc location
Measures of volatility
Aid volatility (Table 2) This represents the mean of the square of the error term from regressing aid disbursements on a trend and trend
squared for each country. If predicted aid from this regression is negative, then a lower bound of zero is imposed and
the error adjusted accordingly.
Mean adjusted CV of aid
volatility (Table 2)
Mean adjusted CV (coeﬃcient of variation) divides the standard error of aid volatility, as deﬁned above, in each year
by the mean value of aid in all years for each country. In some years, particularly for debt aid, disbursements are low,
which would lead to very large CVs as normally calculated
The aid error term
(Tables 3 and 4)
In Table 3 we represent the results of an “asymmetric VAR” based on the error term from the trend regression
described above. This error term when squared is aid volatility, but is in its original form, more suitable for analysis in
a VAR. This is also the basis for the positive and negative error terms used in Table 4 as described in the Table
The volatility measure
Figures 1 and 2)
In Figures 1 and 2 the square root of aid volatility, as deﬁned for Table 2, is regressed on a time trend and trend
squared to ﬁt trends in volatility. The square root was used as this more closely relates to the error itself and is less
aﬀected by outliers
CONSEQUENCES OF AID VOLATILITY FOR MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND AID EFFECTIVENESS 63sample of 76 countries from 1975 to 2003. They use a
Hodrick–Prescott ﬁlter 1 to derive aid residuals from a trend.
The square of those residuals then measure volatility in a
speciﬁc year for an individual country. Critical in all this is
how one scales aid, particularly when comparing volatilities
between diﬀerent variables. Bulı´rˇ and Hamann specify aid in
US dollars and government revenue in domestic currency.
Both series were transformed into proportions of nominal
GDP, PPP GDP, and constant US dollars per capita. This
was done in part to remove the impact of scale on variabil-
ity––clearly a variable with a large mean will tend to have a
large variance. But when this is done, the resultant ratio is
aﬀected by both the variance of GDP, the variance of the rev-
enue variable, e.g., aid, and the covariance between the two.
The normalization process that Hudson and Mosley (2008a)
employed involved deﬁning all variables as a proportion of
their mean value for the whole estimation period.
In their original paper, Bulı´rˇ and Hamann found that vola-
tility was highest in the countries which are most aid-depen-
dent, which are generally the poorest and most vulnerable.
However, in their 2008 paper, they found that the pattern to
be more complex, and that both those countries that are little
dependent on aid and those that are heavily dependent on aid
display high aid volatility relative to government revenue.
Hudson and Mosley (2008a) in a subsequent paper found no
evidence for highly aid dependent countries to have higher vol-
atility. Indeed, they concluded that volatility declines as the
aid-revenue ratio increases. But to a large extent they were
able to conﬁrm many of the conclusions of Bulı´rˇ and Hamann,
for example that the ratio of aid to government revenue vola-
tility was in excess of one for almost all countries. The volatil-
ity of overseas aid was also noted to be severe, in relation to
the volatility of domestic revenue, and increasing over time.
(b) The causes and the macroeconomic impact of aid volatility
Relatively little work has been done in analyzing the causes of
volatility and how to reduce it. However, in a work which par-
allels that of Fielding andMavrotas (2005),Hudson andMosley
(2008a) examined the link between volatility and donor concen-
tration. Therewas a tendency for countrieswith high two-donor
concentration ratios, i.e., the share of aid provided by the two
biggest donors, to have relatively high volatility. They alsofound that in part, volatility was in response to recipient need,
e.g., the famines in Ethiopia, but in part it was impacted on by
donor coordination. Eifert and Gelb (2008) argued that the
costs of aid volatility can be dramatically reduced by a ﬂexible
pre-commitment rule which adjusts aid ﬂows in response to
improvements or deteriorations in country performance rat-
ings. They also suggested that a buﬀer stock of annual aid-
ﬁnanced spendingmight enable a corrective feedback loop, with
the buﬀer depending on the size and variability of aid ﬂows.
Turning to self-insurance by recipient countries, Agenor and
Aizenman (2010) studied the impact of aid volatility in a two-
period model, with a ﬁrst-period contingency fund ﬁnanced
through taxation. Unsurprisingly, an increase in aid volatility
is shown to raise the optimal contingency fund. But if future
aid also depends on the size of the contingency fund, the optimal
recipient policy may entail no self-insurance.
Much more work has focused on the impact of volatility on
the macroeconomy. For example, Lensink and Morrissey
(2000) concluded that volatility damages the macroeconomic
eﬀectiveness of aid. Arellano, Bulı´rˇ, Lane, and Lipschitz
(2009) examined the eﬀects of aid and its volatility on con-
sumption, investment, and the structure of production in the
context of an inter-temporal, two-sector general equilibrium
model. They argued that a permanent ﬂow of aid mainly
ﬁnances consumption rather than investment and that aid vol-
atility results in substantial welfare losses to consumers, equiv-
alent to 8% of the aid budget. Hudson and Mosley (2008b)
analyzed the impact of aid volatility on GDP/GNP shares of
expenditure. Negative volatility reduces investment and gov-
ernment expenditure shares and also the import share. This
may be because of the type of aid which is subject to volatility,
or because consumers are better able to absorb shocks by
drawing on savings and/or borrowing than other agents.
The results also suggest a limited ability of governments to
rearrange revenue ﬂows to reduce the impact of volatility upon
their expenditure priorities. Positive volatility also reduces
investment and government expenditure shares, as well as
increasing consumers’ expenditure share. These results suggest
that absorptive capacity constraints particularly limit aid’s
eﬀectiveness with respect to both investment and government
spending. Rodrik (1990) also analyzed the problems revenue
volatility can cause developing countries, while Mosley and
Suleiman (2007) showed that the ability of the recipient coun-
64 WORLD DEVELOPMENTtry’s public sector to implement coherent investment programs
and ﬁscal policies is reduced by aid volatility.
Chauvet and Guillaumont (2009) concluded that aid tends
to neutralize volatility in export ﬂows and also income volatil-
ity, while aid volatility reduces its eﬀectiveness in these
respects. They also showed that the higher eﬀectiveness of
aid in vulnerable countries is, to a large extent, due to this sta-
bilizing eﬀect. Hudson and Mosley (2008a) diﬀerentiated
between positive/upside and negative/downside volatility.
Both reduce the impact of aid on growth, but subsequently
some of this adverse impact is reversed, although only for
positive volatility. With negative volatility there is no such
reversal. This may reﬂect problems of absorptive capacity
being short-term only. Positive volatility may also be reacting
to emergencies and reﬂect an element of ﬂexibility inherent in
“reactive” forms of aid. The high incidence of this type of aid
is, therefore, potentially an asset rather than a liability. Even
negative volatility might feasibly have longer-term beneﬁcial
impacts, in persuading recipients to move toward policy
reform, which are not apparent within the relatively short
time-horizon Hudson and Mosley analyzed.
(c) A more disaggregated approach to the impact of aid
volatility
Some studies have examined other macroeconomic factors
such as public sector behavior in developing countries (Mav-
rotas & Ouattara, 2006a, 2006b). But there have been few
attempts to focus the attention more ﬁnely, and there is also
a tendency to treat all aid as the same. Clemens, Radelet,
and Bhavnani (2004) questioned this and argued that diﬀerent
types of aid, impact on growth over diﬀerent time frames, and
to lump it all together in cross-country growth regressions is
inappropriate. They focused on aid which could stimulate
growth in a four year time-horizon. This includes budget
and balance-of-payments support, investments in infrastruc-
ture, and aid for productive sectors such as agriculture and
industry.
Fielding and Mavrotas (2005) distinguished between sector
aid and total aid in examining aid volatility in 66 countries
over 1975–2004. They built on the conclusion by Levin and
Dollar (2005) that aid is more volatile in countries identiﬁed
as having weak political institutions and historically poor
macroeconomic policies. Consistent with this, Fielding and
Mavrotas (2008) concluded that institutional quality and mac-
roeconomic stability aﬀect aid volatility, as does reliance on a
small number of donors. However, the relative importance of
these eﬀects varies across diﬀerent aid types. Reﬂecting this,
countries that have recently agreed to International Monetary
Fund (IMF) conditionality experience higher total aid volatil-
ity, but not higher sector aid volatility. This suggests that hav-
ing agreed to such conditionality is a sign of weakness in
existing macroeconomic policy. They also found that the fac-
tors driving up sector aid volatility are diﬀerent to those
impacting on total aid volatility. In addition, a number of indi-
vidual donors (in particular, Germany, US and the European
Commission) appear to be associated with relatively high vol-
atility sector aid ﬂows.
The possibility that diﬀerent types of aid may have diﬀerent
impacts on the recipient has been noted by, e.g., Chatterjee,
Sakoulis, and Turnovsky (2003), Clemens et al. (2004), Reddy
and Minoiu (2006), Mavrotas (2002, 2005) and Mavrotas and
Ouattara (2006a). Mavrotas and Ouattara (2007) found that
both project aid and ﬁnancial program aid exert a positive, sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect on total expenditure, but that project aid also
appears to increase capital expenditure, while ﬁnancialprogram aid is associated with an increase in government con-
sumption. This suggests that project ﬁnancing is more likely to
be growth enhancing than program aid. They found no evi-
dence that aid ﬂows are associated with a reduction in taxation
eﬀort. Indeed, project aid ﬂows are associated with an increase
in trade tax. Neanidis and Varvarigos (2009), using the CRS
database, found that aid disbursements used for productive
sectors have a positive eﬀect on growth, but pure transfers
reduce growth. Aid volatility is found to hurt growth, only
when aid is used productively, while the volatility of pure
aid disbursements is associated with higher growth.
Wolf (2007) and Stuckler, Basu, and McKee (2011) focused
on the eﬀects of aid volatility on micro-targets. Wolf analyzes
the eﬀects of the volume and volatility of aid on education,
health, water, and sanitation outcomes. Overall the share of
oﬃcial development assistance (ODA) that is provided for
education and health seems to have a positive impact on out-
comes in these sectors, whereas total aid seems to be negatively
associated with these. Aid volatility is associated with better
outcomes in sanitation, water, and infant mortality, contrary
to expectations. The merits of this paper are in its focus and
the use of sector aid as well as total aid. But the research mea-
sures aid volatility as the coeﬃcient of variation for total aid
during 1980–2002, while the regressions themselves relate to
just 2002. Hence, this is entirely diﬀerent to the concept of vol-
atility as used by most of the literature, and it is not really
clear what this is picking up. Stuckler, Basu, and McKee focus
on one of the possible consequences of volatility. They ﬁnd
that for each $1 of development assistance for health, about
$0.37 is added to the health system. However, evaluating
IMF-borrowing versus nonIMF-borrowing countries reveals
that nonborrowers add about $0.45, whereas borrowers add
less than $0.01 to the health system. This, they argue, could
be because World Bank and IMF macroeconomic policies spe-
ciﬁcally encourage governments to divert aid to reserves to
cope with aid volatility.
There are thus arguably gaps in the literature, which we seek
to reduce, in (i) understanding the interrelationship between
volatility of the diﬀerent aid sectors, on which there has been
very little work and (ii) understanding the impact of sector aid,
and aid volatility, on micro targets. In this respect, the key
part of the paper is Section 5. We begin by looking at volatility
and trends in volatility of total aid and its constituent parts.
This will help us understand what contributes most to the vol-
atility of total aid and whether volatility is increasing or
decreasing. We then turn to analyze the interactions between
the diﬀerent aid sectors through an “asymmetric vector
autoregression (VAR)”, before ﬁnally turning to analyze the
impact of sector aid and aid volatility on ﬁve speciﬁc targets.3. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
(a) The micro–macro adding up problem
Aid can impact on the target variables in two diﬀerent ways,
which one might loosely term supply side and demand side
eﬀects. Take, e.g., school completion rates which we examine
later. Education aid targets the supply side, potentially
improving the educational system, by, e.g., increasing the
number, or the quality, of schools. Other types of aid can
loosen the constraints on children going to school. For exam-
ple, health aid, if it increases the health of the adult popula-
tion, potentially increases their earning power and their
ability to contribute to the household production function,
reducing the need to rely on children in these respects, thus
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also occur through aid which increases access to the Internet.
Hence it is not simply a case that if we wish to target human
capital we should think exclusively about education aid.
The total impact of aid from all sectors j (Aj) on a particular
target (Yi) can be written as:
XJ
j¼1
Aj
@Yi
@Aj
ð1Þ
For many aid sectors and targets, the partial derivative will
be zero. We would expect education aid to impact on primary
school completion rates, rather than energy sector aid. But, as
already argued, primary school completion rates may also
depend upon socioeconomic factors and hence other aid sec-
tors may be relevant in this context. The total impact on some
macroeconomic variable such as growth (g) will then be found
by summing the impact across the I targets:
XJ
j¼1
XI
i¼1
Aj
@g
@Yi
@Yi
@Aj
: ð2Þ
Aid volatility impacts upon this by adversely impacting upon
oYi/oAj, i.e., reducing the eﬀectiveness of aid. The total impact
of aid volatility on the macroeconomic target will then equal
XJ
j¼1
XI
i¼1
Aj
@g
@Yi
AVj
@Yji
@AVj
: ð3Þ
where AVj is the volatility of Aj and Y
j
i ¼ @Yi@Aj. As we shall see
later, there is an argument that we should further distinguish
between positive and negative aid volatility.
Simply focusing on the impact of total aid volatility on a sin-
gle macroeconomic variable such as growth misses two diﬀer-
ent eﬀects. First, aid in sector j may switch between (micro-)
targets, that is, education aid, for example, switches from
one locality to another. This will not be reﬂected in overall
aid volatility, but will result in positive volatility for one
(micro-) target and negative volatility for another one. Second,
and more the concern of this paper, aid may switch between
sectors. Again, overall aid will show no volatility, but the indi-
vidual sectors, will be aﬀected.
(b) The donor’s allocation problem
We assume donors tend to maximize some form of welfare
function subject to a budget constraint. They will be aware
that volatility is potentially damaging to both the recipient
country and its own credibility as a donor. But nonetheless,
aid may still be volatile for a number of reasons. First, volatil-
ity may be a response to recipient behavior. A failure to imple-
ment previous commitments, or a perceived corrupt
bureaucracy or political system, may see aid fall below
intended disbursements. In this case we would expect to see
no recovery of aid in succeeding periods, following a shortfall.
Indeed the reverse may be the case, shocks may be perpetu-
ated. Alternatively, an emergency in one country may lead
to a tightening of budgets for other countries. In this case
the donor will juggle the aid budget as best they can. Within
a country, they will reduce the aid most in those sectors which
are least important to the donor 2 and where, for example, it
can be substituted between t and t + 1 with relatively little
adverse impact. Similarly there may be a need to switch aid
between sectors within countries, quite independently of what
is happening elsewhere. This can occur in response to an emer-
gency in the country or unforeseen developments possiblyassociated with existing aid spending. In this case the donor
may seek to reduce aid in related sectors, e.g., given a surge
in program aid, reduce government aid. However, as already
indicated, having diverted aid away from sector j in period t,
the donor may respond by increasing it above trend in the fol-
lowing period and vice versa in a sector which saw an aid
surge. In this way aid shocks can have ripple eﬀects.(c) Measuring volatility
We do not use the Hodrick–Prescott ﬁlter to derive esti-
mates of volatility, as, particularly with respect to disburse-
ments, we have relatively few data points to work with for
each country. 3 Instead we regress aid in sector j on a time
trend and its square to calculate the trend. Squared deviations
from this trend are then assumed to represent volatility. This
leaves the possibility that some predicted aid values may be
negative; we therefore impose a lower bound of zero and
adjust the measures of volatility accordingly. 4 Each trend is
ﬁtted for one country at a time. This assumes that in the initial
periods, recipient countries are aware of this trend; that if aid,
for example, rises steadily over the period, they are aware of
this right at the beginning of the period. It is not obvious this
is the case, and certainly at the beginning of a sustained period
of growth, or decline, in the aid budget, the recipient country
may be surprised. Even if the change is anticipated, they may
well have diﬃculties in responding to change, or harbor
doubts as to whether donors will fulﬁll commitments.4. DATA
The CRS has annual data on aid, relating to commitments
and disbursements. Commitments are in eﬀect promises of
aid, which may be fulﬁlled immediately, in the future or even
not at all. Disbursements are the “release of funds to or the
purchase of goods or services for a recipient. They record
the actual international transfer of ﬁnancial resources, or of
goods or services valued at the cost to the donor”. The CRS
has been used in many of the recent analyses on aid volatility
and aid impact (e.g., Clemens et al., 2004; Fielding & Mavro-
tas, 2008; Neanidis & Varvarigos, 2009). But there are doubts
about its suitability in early years. With respect to disburse-
ments, before 2002 the annual coverage was below 60%, while
it has been around and over 90% since 2002, and reached
nearly 100% by 2007. Thus the OECD warns against using
the earlier data for sectors, and these data on the main data-
base are available only since 1995 for commitments and since
2002 for disbursements. As a consequence, 2002 represents the
start date for the sample period we use in this paper. In our
main regression analysis, as in the next sector, there are 137
countries. The panel is almost balanced with just two countries
having less than the full number of observations.
The term “aid sector” signiﬁes the sector of the recipient’s
economy that the aid activity is designed to assist, e.g., health,
energy, or agriculture. Some contributions are not targeted to
a speciﬁc sector, e.g., emergency aid. These are called “nonsec-
tor allocable aid.” But all the data are derived from the section
of the database termed “sector,” which is why we use this gen-
eric term in this paper. For activities cutting across several sec-
tors, either a multi-sector sector code or the code
corresponding to the largest component of the activity is used.
We analyze all the main sectors, or their constituent parts, but
not all of the subsectors. Instead we focus on the social and
production subsectors. More details on the data can be found
in an Appendix.
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we need to normalize aid in some manner. We do this by tak-
ing aid as a proportion of recipient country GDP. The pros
and cons of the various alternatives are discussed in Hudson
and Mosley (2008a). We are focused on comparing aid volatil-
ity between diﬀerent aid sectors rather than between aid and
some other revenue variable such as government expenditure.
In this case, in relative terms, the various diﬀerences between
diﬀerent normalization procedures are less important. We
focus our analysis on disbursements rather than commitments,
as these represent actual aid ﬂows rather than the promises of
ﬂows. The data are available for diﬀerent donors and groups
of donors. We use ODA for all donors.5. RESULTS
In this section we seek to (i) analyze the volatility of individ-
ual sectors, (ii) identify any trends, albeit over a very short
time period, (iii) analyze the extent to which aid shocks are
corrected for in the following year and (iv) analyze the extent
to which diﬀerent aid sectors impact on diﬀerent target vari-
ables.
(a) The makeup of overall volatility
We begin by examining the causes of volatility, in terms of
linking overall volatility to its component parts. As Fielding
and Mavrotas (2008) emphasize, the variance of a variable
made of n components is the sum of the n variances plus twice
each of the covariances. Thus the overall variance can exceed
or fall short of the sum of each of the components, or sector,
variances depending upon the signs of the covariances. If over-
all, the covariances are positive, it will indicate that the sectors
have tended to move together, with aid tending to increase or
decrease for countries as a share of GDP. If on balance they
are negative, it will indicate that there have been shifts in aid
between sectors within countries.
Table 2 shows the volatility of total disbursements in the
ﬁrst column, reporting the mean and the 90th percentile. It will
be recalled that these relate to the squared residuals from a
trend based regression. 5 In the following columns we have
the same data for most individual sectors. The ﬁnal column
relates to the sum of all the sector volatilities, not just the ones
in this table. There are substantial diﬀerences between the ﬁrst
and the ﬁnal columns, but, as expected, the correlation
between the two is very high. Hence in an OLS regression of
total aid volatility on summed sector volatility across all years
and countries, the R2 is 0.89. The diﬀerence between the two is
due to the covariances between the diﬀerent sectors impacting
on total aid volatility in the ﬁrst column but not the ﬁnal one. 6
It is not a simple story of one being consistently greater than
the other, indicating that in some years the net eﬀect of the
covariances is negative and in others it is positive. Thus in
2007 there were 12 signiﬁcant, at the 1% level, negative aid sec-
tor correlations and eight positive ones, whereas in 2009 these
ﬁgures were ﬁve and 11 respectively. There is, however, a ten-
dency, 2007 apart, for the positive correlation to become rela-
tively more important over time, as reﬂected in the gap
between the ﬁrst and ﬁnal columns becoming steadily more
positive. This suggests that increasingly all aid sectors within
countries are moving up or down together, and that trade-oﬀs
within countries are becoming relatively less important. It is a
moot question as to which is the better indicator of aid vola-
tility, that relating to total aid or that to the sum of its constit-
uent parts. However, as already indicated, it seems reasonableto argue that it is more the latter, as the damage done to
health, education and industry is not reduced (increased)
because they are negatively (positively) correlated with each
other. If this is accepted, then it follows that a measure of
aid volatility based on total aid is limited. Indeed arguably
the problem is worse than this, as a single sector in itself is
likely to be made of multiple subsectors, for example, in diﬀer-
ent localities. 7 This is related to the point made by Fielding
and Mavrotas (2008) that an increase in sector aid volatility
does not on average appear to entail any signiﬁcant increase
in total aid volatility. They go on to emphasize that, in general,
the factors driving up sector aid volatility are not the same as
those driving up total aid volatility.
The remaining columns relate to individual sector volatility.
The most important sectors in explaining total volatility are
debt aid followed by government and program assistance
(PA) aid. Debt volatility in particular goes a long way to
explaining total volatility. Take this out of the picture, as in
the second column, and aid disbursements appear substan-
tially less volatile. However, being averages the ﬁgures are mis-
leading to an extent, as they are substantially aﬀected by
outliers. This is reﬂected in the ﬁgures for the 90th percentile.
The peak year for total volatility as measured by the mean is
2006, followed by 2008. But for the 90th percentile, it is the
cluster of years 2005–2007. The dominant factor in both
2006 and 2008 is the volatility of debt aid. However in 2007
aid to government also showed considerable volatility. As dis-
cussed below, this may anticipate the peak in debt aid in the
following year.
These data tell us the most important sectors in determining
overall volatility, but do not tell us which sectors are most vol-
atile. A sector may have a small entry in Table 2 simply
because it is a small sector in absolute terms, but it may still
in itself be characterized by high volatility. To analyze this,
we need to remove the scale factor. Dividing the square root
of the error squared term 8 for aid sector A by the average
level of A’s aid over all years, in a manner similar to the coef-
ﬁcient of variation, achieves this. The result is shown in the
ﬁnal row of Table 2. We now get a very diﬀerent picture. Debt
aid is still the most volatile. But aid for the social sectors,
including education and health, tends to exhibit low volatility.
Apart from debt aid, the most volatile sectors are industry,
PA, and government aid. There are signiﬁcant correlations
between sectors, which change from year to year. But over
the whole period, there are ﬁve signiﬁcant negative correla-
tions where the absolute value for the correlation statistic
exceeds 0.2. Three of these involved PA. This is consistent with
our a priori beliefs regarding the likelihood of PA being prone
to short-term aid switching. Based on similar criteria, there
were also ﬁve positive correlations, three of which involved
linkages between education, health, and multi-sector aid. 9
(b) Trends in volatility
In this section we examine whether there are any trends in
volatility. There has, as we saw in the literature review, been
a lot of work done which has concluded that volatility has
been increasing. There are two questions we seek to answer.
Firstly, given this more recent data is it still increasing and sec-
ondly, is the same pattern in evidence for all sectors? On the
ﬁrst of these, there is reason to suppose that the increase in
volatility will have stopped and may even have been reversed.
This is because of the publicity given to this issue both in pub-
lic pronouncements and through the research work we have
already reviewed. Policy makers will be aware of this and
can be expected to respond accordingly. On the second issue,
Table 2. Volatility: Aid Disbursements, 2002–09
Total aid Total
aid
net debt
Debt Humanitarian Education Health Other
social
Infrastructure Industry Other
production
Multi-sector Government PA Sum of sector variances
Mean
2002 20.282 2.842 20.602 0.242 0.073 0.02 0.613 0.118 0.025 0.058 0.067 0.044 0.222 22.168
2003 41.441 3.014 47.356 0.308 0.236 0.05 0.445 0.22 0.049 0.091 0.396 0.106 1.519 51.019
2004 24.926 4.113 19.759 1.011 0.227 0.11 0.955 0.29 0.025 0.215 0.418 0.325 2.178 25.648
2005 49.738 7.45 39.836 1.471 0.122 0.18 0.355 0.429 0.034 0.056 0.191 1.652 0.362 45.406
2006 132.19 7.371 123.33 0.491 0.078 0.09 0.279 0.12 0.028 0.057 0.179 1.906 0.608 127.3
2007 31.94 13.268 29.846 0.536 0.129 0.11 0.828 0.387 0.109 0.217 0.095 16.603 1.229 50.168
2008 96.562 4.67 69.365 0.133 0.044 0.07 0.176 0.418 0.035 0.077 0.38 1.699 9.438 81.85
2009 41.963 5.489 21.944 0.263 0.05 0.07 0.266 0.148 0.019 0.049 0.129 0.49 2.869 26.326
90th percentile
2002 32.302 2.98 24.261 0.059 0.081 0.05 0.237 0.237 0.016 0.064 0.077 0.122 0.405 28.856
2003 24.59 6.001 11.829 0.202 0.198 0.092 0.466 0.466 0.043 0.102 0.148 0.226 0.633 24
2004 59.55 4.48 35.416 0.267 0.189 0.09 0.671 0.671 0.023 0.094 0.078 0.258 0.741 65.693
2005 85.808 9.568 74.398 1.468 0.196 0.084 0.474 0.474 0.013 0.108 0.158 0.247 0.587 84.566
2006 415.27 3.664 405.729 0.37 0.221 0.066 0.317 0.317 0.007 0.07 0.105 0.269 0.948 427.11
2007 96.419 6.73 71.407 0.541 0.141 0.092 0.279 0.279 0.012 0.114 0.103 0.172 1.684 83.105
2008 29.789 3.667 22.632 0.08 0.075 0.11 0.593 0.593 0.018 0.113 0.155 0.18 0.856 28.027
2009 19.678 3.822 7.721 0.085 0.042 0.059 0.394 0.394 0.012 0.046 0.08 0.112 0.608 14.387
Mean adjusted CV
0.274 0.199 1.031 0.34 0.162 0.191 0.18 0.237 0.509 0.25 0.212 0.307 0.344
Average values of aid as a% of GDP
Mean 10.00 7.90 2.107 0.637 0.866 0.606 1.194 0.977 0.124 0.497 0.720 0.873 1.078
Median 3.72 3.36 0.001 0.034 0.325 0.155 0.449 0.313 0.019 0.172 0.215 0.231 0.082
Notes: The ﬁgures relate to the mean and 90th percentile values across all years, and aid recipients, of aid volatility as deﬁned in Table 1 for the sectors deﬁned in the Appendix. PA denotes program
assistance. The ﬁnal column relates to the sum of volatility in all the individual aid sectors. This includes smaller sectors such as relating to refugees and administration which are not included in the
previous columns. The mean adjusted CV adjusts volatility for the scale factor as described in Table 1.
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Figure 1. Trends in aid volatility.
68 WORLD DEVELOPMENTwe anticipate that there will be signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
sectors. Some may be deemed of particular importance, e.g.,
health and education which are at the heart of the Millennium
Development Goals, and hence have not seen the same rise in
volatility as others. For other sectors there may be external
factors driving increased volatility, e.g., with respect to
humanitarian aid, the increased frequency of natural disasters
(Hudson & Mosley, 2008a).
The measure of aid volatility frequently used tends to be the
error term squared as reported in Table 2. In this analysis we
will however not use this, but its square root, 10 which is less
inﬂuenced by outliers. We regress this on a trend and squared
trend, and use the coeﬃcients to calculate a nonlinear trend.
Country ﬁxed eﬀects are included to allow for systematic
country diﬀerences. The curves for total aid, with debt netted
out, and infrastructure, are shown in Figure 1. The trend vari-
ables are jointly signiﬁcant at the 5% level. We can see volatil-
ity appears to increase until about 2006 after which it begins to
decline. This nonlinear pattern, although not necessarily with
the same turning point, is repeated for education and human-
itarian aid, as can be seen from Figure 2, and also for health
and debt. The trend variables were jointly signiﬁcant at the
1% level in all these equations. The turning point was 2006
for all apart for education and infrastructure, when it was
2005 and 2007 respectively. However, there were no signiﬁcant
trends, either linear or nonlinear, in government, PA, industry,.0
8
.1
.1
2
.1
4
.1
6
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
Ai
d
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
H
um
an
ita
ria
n 
Ai
d
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Year
Humanitarian Aid Education Aid
Note: See Table 1 and appendix for definitions
Figure 2. Trends in aid volatility.other-production, multi-sector aid, and other-social aid. We
noted earlier that 2006 was a peak year for debt aid volatility
and it is possible that this had knock-on eﬀects on other aid
sectors. This is not something we explore in more depth than
in the VAR regressions which follow in the next section. Nor
do we have a long enough run of data to discern any more
general trends. But certainly there is no evidence that aid vol-
atility is increasing.
(c) The dynamics of aid volatility
In this section we examine the dynamics of aid volatility via
a modiﬁed VAR on aid volatility with respect to disburse-
ments. Underlying these regressions is the behavior of donors
trying to allocate aid to maximize its impact, given an objec-
tive function as discussed earlier In any one period donors
may be forced to reduce aid below trend, they will tend to
do this in those sectors where it will do least harm, and in
order to minimize the harm then to compensate for that short-
fall in the following year. Some of these shocks may take the
form of an aid surge in some other country or in some other
sector within the same country. In order to be able to compen-
sate for a sector shortfall the following year, within a budget
which is approximately ﬁxed over a several year period, the
sectors which experienced the aid surge may see a reduction
in aid. Of course an aid shortfall may reﬂect a punishment
in some form by the donor on the recipient country, possibly
in response to the failure to meet commitments previously
made for aid given conditionally. In this case the shortfall
would not be made good the following year, but could poten-
tially be continued. There is also the possibility that aid surges
will be corrected for.
We do not regress volatility on lagged volatility as in a stan-
dard VAR, but in what we term an asymmetric VAR, distin-
guishing between positive and negative volatility; that is, we
regress the error term, rather than the error term squared,
on lagged positive and negative errors terms 11 as two separate
variables. As discussed above, positive and negative aid vola-
tility are separate concepts, with separate causes and impacts.
Thus there is reason to anticipate that they will have diﬀerent
impacts on future volatility within a VAR structure. If their
coeﬃcients are the same, then it is equivalent to a standard
VAR. But our null hypothesis is that the impacts will be diﬀer-
ent. A second hypothesis is that the coeﬃcients on a variable’s
own lags will tend to be negative, e.g., that a shortfall in one
year will be partially compensated for the following year.
The speciﬁcation of the variables in this VAR comprises all
the sectors reported in Table 2. We have only a limited time
dimension, but the cross-section element gives a reasonable
number of observations. However, because of this we utilize
only a ﬁrst order VAR.
The coeﬃcients on the other lagged variables will reﬂect the
lagged trade-oﬀs donors make in the aid allocation process. A
negative coeﬃcient indicates that an aid surge/fall in one sec-
tor is subsequently being compensated for by a fall/surge in
another sector. A positive coeﬃcient may indicate closely
related sectors where an increase in one signals a subsequent
increase in another, possibly because aid in the ﬁrst sector
facilitates the subsequent increase of aid in the second. A pri-
ori we expect there to be more negative interactions between
related sectors, as donors seek to trade-oﬀ of “like with like.”
The two government linked sectors, PA and Government, are
obvious potential examples. Secondly we expect over-arching
sectors to be particularly sensitive to shocks in other sectors,
simply because they are closely related to many sectors. A
key over-arching sector is PA. Finally, we anticipate that
Table 3. Dynamic Impacts of Volatility
LHS
variable
Education Health Other
social
Debt Humani-
tarian
Industry Other
production
Infrastructure Multi-
sector
Government PA
Lagged variables
Education
 0.4627* 0.0004 0.2554 1.152 0.2222 0.0246 0.1881 0.1337 0.0074 0.6084 0.9651
(3.28) (0.00) (1.11) (1.70) (1.24) (0.49) (1.39) (0.81) (0.03) (1.23) (2.42)
+ 0.0853 0.0939 0.1507 0.9494 0.336 0.0173 0.2122 0.2754 0.0937 0.1273 0.6803
(1.21) (1.33) (0.61) (1.34) (1.45) (0.60) (1.82) (2.14) (1.15) (0.70) (2.41)
Health
 0.1205 0.107 0.2018 0.0839 0.3477 0.0324 0.003 0.3098 0.3934 0.503 0.2494
(0.41) (0.30) (0.68) (0.05) (1.18) (0.62) (0.02) (1.50) (1.02) (1.30) (0.85)
+ 0.0028 0.4597* 0.3172 0.4254 0.3342 0.0258 0.1146 0.1717 0.00085 0.3474 0.136
(0.03) (2.80) (1.03) (0.41) (1.79) (0.71) (1.65) (2.35) (0.01) (1.12) (0.67)
Other social
 0.0421 0.0517 0.302 0.8973 0.0612 0.0655 0.0088 0.2533* 0.1746* 0.7257 0.3028*
(1.31) (0.57) (1.02) (1.82) (0.35) (2.17) (0.32) (4.43) (4.06) (2.18) (4.08)
+ 0.0326 0.0308 0.1894* 0.4004 0.1137 0.0094 0.0224 0.0659 0.0643 0.1048 0.0944
(2.05) (2.16) (4.00) (1.52) (1.65) (0.33) (1.21) (1.32) (1.71) (0.22) (1.46)
Debt
 0.0017 0.0011 0.0041 0.6628* 0.0032 0.0019 0.0045 0.0059 0.000046 0.0622 0.0145
(0.63) (0.32) (0.58) (4.53) (0.55) (0.55) (1.88) (1.18) (0.01) (1.78) (1.16)
+ 0.00047 0.0016 0.00038 0.2557* 0.001 0.0018 0.00076 0.0031 0.00066 0.0158 0.0133
(0.19) (0.70) (0.10) (3.75) (0.27) (0.59) (0.38) (0.47) (0.18) (1.66) (1.71)
Humanitarian
 0.0334 0.0914 0.0255 1.343 0.3259 0.0159 0.095* 0.0365 0.0635 0.5506 0.0847
(1.32) (1.85) (0.14) (1.57) (1.13) (0.40) (2.90) (0.68) (1.53) (1.04) (0.88)
+ 0.00031 0.0188 0.1599 0.1691 0.2756* 0.0548 0.0446 0.0601 0.0583 0.4252 0.0399
(0.08) (0.39) (0.90) (0.51) (2.61) (2.40) (1.03) (2.11) (2.18) (1.63) (0.64)
Industry
 0.0463 0.0731 0.1443 0.7789 0.0426 0.4395 0.3611 0.3038 0.3452 0.4575 0.0223
(0.29) (0.56) (0.17) (0.24) (0.12) (2.47) (2.13) (0.73) (0.94) (0.46) (0.10)
+ 0.0306 0.1158 0.2117 2.416 0.8729 0.3532* 0.0642 0.7077* 0.3762 0.5672 0.1642
(0.37) (1.27) (0.69) (0.81) (1.48) (5.15) (0.81) (3.04) (1.45) (1.08) (0.57)
Other
production
 0.1451 0.0229 0.1856 1.032 0.0632 0.0296 0.3265 0.3726 0.0399 0.1063 0.4116
(1.12) (0.28) (1.92) (1.09) (0.40) (0.91) (2.09) (1.88) (0.22) (0.25) (2.54)
+ 0.1249* 0.1352 0.1986 1.987 0.1234 0.0114 0.2501 0.046 0.0304 0.1399 0.1074
(2.86) (1.11) (1.35) (1.01) (0.84) (0.43) (2.34) (0.25) (0.56) (0.74) (0.79)
Infrastructure
 0.1311 0.1393 0.1538 0.944 0.2063 0.0371 0.1756 0.3043* 0.1178 0.5952 0.4538*
(2.00) (1.88) (0.97) (1.34) (1.52) (0.78) (1.22) (2.67) (0.63) (0.98) (3.32)
+ 0.053 0.00029 0.0627 0.3614 0.1301 0.000026 0.0017 0.1878 0.029 0.1735 0.1523
(1.21) (0.01) (0.75) (0.62) (1.11) (0.00) (0.04) (2.13) (0.42) (0.82) (1.28)
Multi–sector
 0.1657* 0.1785 0.0471 0.2203 0.0163 0.0465 0.1093 0.0442 0.6722* 0.2619 0.7136*
(2.77) (1.76) (0.74) (0.49) (0.23) (1.65) (1.24) (0.71) (5.55) (1.19) (4.02)
+ 0.1249 0.1662 0.4938 1.617 0.2043 0.0042 0.0228 0.1932 0.2189 0.0894 0.0594
(0.69) (0.87) (1.93) (1.49) (1.28) (0.14) (0.36) (1.78) (1.01) (0.26) (0.13)
Government
 0.0446 0.0654 0.2077 1.631* 0.0342 0.0519 0.0255* 0.0499 0.0334 0.9692* 0.5257*
(1.62) (1.44) (2.20) (5.33) (0.59) (2.21) (2.69) 1.58 (0.62) (4.71) (6.06)
+ 0.0095 0.0083 0.0017 1.606* 0.0882 0.0064 0.0163 0.0493 0.0487 0.2625* 0.6807*
(0.87) (1.11) (0.04) (6.39) (1.93) (0.99) (1.58) (1.69) (1.64) (6.21) (15.46)
PA
 0.0943 0.0996 0.076 0.0769 0.2403* 0.00041 0.0301 0.1322 0.1243 0.3273 0.2146
(1.88) (1.68) (1.58) (0.20) (2.90) (0.01) (1.26) (2.01) (2.18) (1.08) (1.38)
+ 0.0206 0.0353 0.0987* 0.1496 0.0839* 0.0379* 0.0077 0.0463* 0.0135 0.4141* 0.316*
(1.38) (2.29) (4.10) (0.75) (3.73) (4.31) (0.91) (2.80) (0.66) (6.00) (4.91)
(continued on next page)
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Table 3—(continued)
LHS
variable
Education Health Other
social
Debt Humani-
tarian
Industry Other
production
Infrastructure Multi-
sector
Government PA
Asymmetry 5% ns 10% 5% ns ns 10% ns 10% 1% ns
Observations 957 957 957 957 957 957 957 957 957 957 957
v2 1,672 2,052 1,861 1,100 3,450 1,300 288.3 1,244 7,905 1,100 5,600
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the CRS database as detailed in the Appendix.
Notes: Regressions based on aid disbursements, regressing the errors on lagged positive and negative errors. Estimated by random eﬀects over the period
2003–09. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the country level. PA denotes program assistance. Asymmetry relates to whether the coeﬃcients on the
two lagged dependent variables are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, ns denotes “not signiﬁcant,” 5% denotes they are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at that level. v2 denotes
the likelihood coeﬃcient. The +/ after the variable name indicates whether it relates to positive or negative volatility. Thus “Health ” is equal to the
negative error terms and an upper bound of zero when the error term is positive.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
70 WORLD DEVELOPMENThealth, being at the heart of the Millennium Development
Goals, will tend to be protected from volatility, as suggested
by its low volatility in Table 2. The same may also be true
for education.
The results are shown in Table 3. We use as our bench-
mark the 1% signiﬁcance level. Focusing ﬁrst on the own
eﬀects, i.e., the impacts of the twin lagged dependent vari-
ables, there is a tendency for errors in period t  1 to be
partially corrected for in the following period. This is the
case for ﬁve of the 12 negative volatilities and seven of
the positive volatilities. There are no signiﬁcant positive
coeﬃcients, indicating an absence of shock persistence. It
is thus not simply a matter of volatility being limited to a
single period and then a return to trend, it is that a positive
injection of aid above trend tends to be partially compen-
sated for in the following period by a below-trend level of
aid and vice versa. There are also 21 cross-sector impacts
and, as anticipated, over half relate to PA. In six cases a
shock from PA has impacts on other sectors and in ﬁve
cases the reverse is the case. When the impact is negative,
the former is consistent with the hypothesis that other sec-
tors are “paying for” the aid surge in PA. In two sectors
there was a positive knock-on eﬀect from positive volatility
in PA, these were humanitarian aid and infrastructure aid.
The latter may indicate the preparatory work that needs
to take place before a large infrastructure project can begin.
The former may relate to disaster prevention, which is part
of humanitarian aid. Also in accordance with our expecta-
tions, none of the interactions relate to health, although
two do involve education. There is little evidence for debt
aid crowding out other forms of aid. 12 The only linkage
to debt aid is from government sector aid, which is consis-
tent with the donor preparing the recipient for subsequent
debt relief as suggested by Cassimon and Essers (2013).
Apart from PA, the other sectors which see substantial
interaction are government and infrastructure aid, which
to an extent share some of the over-arching characteristics
of PA. For example, infrastructure aid declines in response
to positive volatility in industry aid. These two sectors are
competing for similar resources (Choi, 2005) and an increase
in aid for one may signal a decline for the other.
Is the use of an asymmetric VAR justiﬁed? Just focusing
on the own lagged impact, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in
the two coeﬃcients in one equation at the 1% level of sig-
niﬁcance. It is, however, often more diﬃcult to prove a sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerence between two variables than signiﬁcance
per se, and two other equations have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
coeﬃcients at the 5% level of signiﬁcance and three at the
10% level. The use of an asymmetric VAR thus seems justi-
ﬁed.(d) The impact of volatility
In this section we analyze the impact of volatility on several
aspects of a country, which in general have not been the sub-
ject of much research, at least with respect to the impact of aid.
In part this is because some of the data, such as that relating to
Internet usage, are available only over a limited time frame.
But this time frame tends to match our data from the CRS
database, and in any case with the cross-section data supple-
menting the time series data, there are now suﬃcient observa-
tions to make analysis plausible, even if slightly constrained.
The other target variables are death rates, male and female pri-
mary school completion rates and mobile phone subscriptions.
In general these target variables tend to show substantial var-
iation over time, albeit often along a trend. The choice of our
variables is, in part, dictated by data availability and in part by
the fact that they represent a combination of social targets and
“economic targets.”
We argued earlier that aid can impact on target variables in
two diﬀerent ways, reﬂecting supply side and demand side
eﬀects. With respect to Internet usage, infrastructure aid
may improve the quality and coverage of the Internet connec-
tion, a supply side eﬀect, but other aid such as for education
and industry can increase the demand from users, either home
users, or business ones. In terms of death rates, health aid can
improve the quality of care, but aid which promotes growth
can increase living standards and reduce poverty thus impact-
ing on death rates, while education can facilitate healthy life
styles. Hence when thinking about what types of aid might
successfully promote a particular target, we should not restrict
ourselves to the “obvious ones.”
Including aid in a regression with the target variable on the
left hand side variable is not satisfactory as it will only capture
a temporary impact and once the aid has ﬁnished, the target
will return to the previous trend. 13 But the impact of aid on
school completion rates should have a longer-term impact,
whether that impact comes from supply side or demand side
eﬀects. Similarly if aid impacts on Internet usage, the impact
is unlikely to be temporary, but longer lasting, as once some-
one is a user, they will tend to stay a user. The same is true, to
varying degrees, of the other variables we are analyzing, For
this reason, we model these variables in a similar manner to
the impact of aid on GDP or GDP per capita in growth regres-
sions (Barro, 1991). Similar to the growth regressions, we
include the base year value of the variable, e.g., for death rates,
the death rate in the ﬁrst year of our sample. The coeﬃcient on
this is expected to be negative, and if so will relate to the speed
of convergence. We also include year dummy variables to cap-
ture general movements over time caused, for example, by
technical progress or the diﬀusion of a new technology. The
CONSEQUENCES OF AID VOLATILITY FOR MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND AID EFFECTIVENESS 71estimations are done using ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) or random eﬀects
as indicated appropriate by the Hausman test, with a correc-
tion for heteroskedasticity using the robust (i.e., the sandwich)
estimator of the standard errors. In the regressions we include
both total aid disbursements and sector speciﬁc disbursements,
as well as positive and negative error volatility, deﬁned in a
similar manner as in Table 3. The null hypothesis is that such
volatility reduces the eﬀectiveness of sector aid when that is
signiﬁcant. A second hypothesis is that positive and negative
volatility will have diﬀerent impacts. The former will present
problems of absorptive capacity, the latter will potentially dis-
rupt planned and existing activities.
The results are shown in Table 4. The ﬁrst equation relates
to death rates. Social infrastructure aid, which includes aid for
health and education as well as water sanitation and indeed
government, 14 is negatively signiﬁcant at the 1% level of sig-
niﬁcance. Positive error terms, however, neutralize this
impact. 15 There is no impact from negative error terms. This
pattern was repeated in the next two equations linked to male
and female primary school completion rates. In both equa-
tions social infrastructure aid is signiﬁcant at the 5% and 1%
levels respectively, with signs which indicate it increases com-
pletion rates. As with death rates, social infrastructure aid pro-
duced better results than aid for speciﬁc social sectors such asTable 4. The Impact of A
Schoo
Aid disbursements Death rate Male
Social infrastructure
Aid 0.00075** 0.008
(3.64) (2.1
Positive error 0.00110** 0.0
(2.66) (1.4
Negative error 0.00018 0.00
(0.44) (0.1
Industry
Aid
Positive error
Negative error
Infrastructure
Aid
Positive error
Negative error
Total disbursements 0.00005 0.00
(1.40) (1.0
Base year value of dependent variable 0.0011** FE
(4.25)
Constant 0.0034 0.0
(1.44) (0.7
Observations 1032 64
R2 0.095 0.2
Notes: Regressions estimated by ﬁxed or random eﬀects as indicated appropriat
across potentially 154 countries, although missing observations reduced this,
Standard errors have been corrected for heteroskedasticity. Year dummy varia
(upper) bound of zero and the coeﬃcient is expected to have an opposite (the sa
the CRS database as detailed in the Appendix.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.education aid. This is not surprising: completion rates, e.g., are
impacted upon by social factors as well as purely education
facilities. In these regressions error volatility has no signiﬁcant
impact. The next two equations relate to economic rather than
social variables. The ﬁrst is for Internet usage. Industry aid
and the two associated error terms are signiﬁcant. The signs
are such that both positive and negative volatility reduce aid
eﬀectiveness. This suggests both that many people in develop-
ing countries access the Internet via their ﬁrms and also that
industry aid has facilitated the adoption of the Internet by
ﬁrms. Internet usage, of course, has social beneﬁts as well as
economic ones and this result is an indication of just how com-
plex the impact of aid can be on an economy and its people.
The ﬁnal column relates to mobile phone subscriptions. In this
case it was infrastructure aid which was signiﬁcant, at the 5%
level, reﬂecting supply side factors. The positive error term was
also signiﬁcant with a sign which indicated volatility reduced
aid eﬀectiveness.
Robustness tests replaced the speciﬁed aid sector with oth-
ers. For social infrastructure we substituted: PA, health, edu-
cation, multi-sector, and government aid. For industry aid we
substituted: PA, education, multi-sector, government, other-
production, and infrastructure aid. For infrastructure aid we
substituted: PA, education, multi-sector, government, other-id on Speciﬁc Targets
l completion rate:
Female Internet use Mobile phone
91* 0.0129**
7) (2.59)
204 0.00830
4) (0.46)
200 0.0206
8) (1.71)
0.2274**
(2.75)
0.3811**
(3.53)
0.1854**
(2.60)
0.0566**
(2.80)
0.1151*
(2.45)
0.0227
(0.45)
038 0.00008 0.00008 0.00027
3) (0.21) (0.10) (0.30)
FE 0.0043* 0.004**
(2.39) (5.08)
122 0.0206 0.155** 0.1068**
0) (1.17) (8.67) (4.84)
2 642 1047 1046
50 0.330 0.160 0.140
e by the Hausman test (a 5% level of signiﬁcance), over the period 2002–09
for example to 120 countries for completion rates. (.) denotes t statistics.
bles have been included. The positive (negative) error term takes a lower
me) sign to that of aid. Source: Compiled by the author based on data from
72 WORLD DEVELOPMENTproduction, nonindustry, and industry aid. None were signif-
icant for death and Internet use. For mobile phone subscrip-
tions, government sector and industry aid were signiﬁcant,
but not when included in a regression with infrastructure,
which remained signiﬁcant. For both school completion rates,
multi-sector aid was also signiﬁcant, but not it’s associated
volatility. In all the equations with random eﬀects the base
year variable was signiﬁcant and indicated convergence. In
none of the equations was total aid disbursements signiﬁcant,
nor were variations on this, e.g., total disbursements less debt
aid.6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have explored a new, or at least a newly
updated, dataset on aid disbursements and commitments,
focusing on the former and issues surrounding volatility.
We have expanded the issue of aid volatility to cover the dif-
ferent aid sectors. Ignoring debt and humanitarian aid, the
most volatile aid sectors as they relate to recipient countries
are linked to government, industry, and PA. Aid for health,
education, and other social sectors have relatively low volatil-
ities. This, however, is not the case with respect to aid for
industry, which raises the question as to whether this reﬂects
the donors’ relative priorities. Much of the total aid volatility
in recent years is due to debt aid. Humanitarian, infrastruc-
ture and aid for governments are also signiﬁcant components
of overall volatility. This reﬂects both the volatility of these
aid sectors, as well as their size. However, we have also
put forward the case that the impact of volatility on an econ-
omy cannot best be judged in terms of overall aid volatility,
but rather by the sum of the volatility of its constituent
sectors. If, for example, education aid and industry aid are
volatile, it is not obvious that their impact on the recipient
country is substantially reduced if they are negatively corre-
lated with each other.
In many cases, positive/negative aid volatility in a particular
sector tends not to be simply short lived with a return to trend,
but also compensated for with negative/positive volatility in
the following period. In addition there is also evidence of
cross-sector impacts, the majority of which involve PA and
government. For the relatively few cross-sector impacts not
involving government or PA, the dominant impact tends to
be negative, that is, e.g., a positive shock is adjusted for not
just in the sector the shock occurred in, but also in other aid
sectors too. Together this suggests that aid donors adjust in
a fairly complex manner the diﬀerent aid to the diﬀerentsectors and that a shock in one can have spillover eﬀects in
subsequent periods.
In the ﬁnal section we examined the impact of aid on
selected variables. These were more micro-focused variables
than typically is the case. The results suggest that what matters
for social targets is social infrastructure aid and for communi-
cations, infrastructure aid, and also industry aid. But given
more data, we might well ﬁnd several diﬀerent types of aid
impact upon a target. Despite the relatively few years at our
disposal, it is also apparent that volatility impacts even on
these fairly focused variables. This emphasizes that sector
aid often has many direct impacts which help contribute to
the total impact of aid on a country’s economy and the well-
being of its people. But aid eﬀectiveness is also often reduced
by aid volatility, both positive and negative. There is much lit-
erature on an optimal aid allocation and this is generally in the
context of allocating aid between countries. But our research
points to another optimality problem, that between sectors
within a country. In order to solve this we need more knowl-
edge of the impact of individual sector aid on speciﬁc targets
and how those targets then impact on macro-variables such
as growth and poverty reduction. In addition the research
emphasizes the importance of minimizing not just total aid
volatility, but also volatility in individual sectors, as much as
is feasible and optimal.
As more observations become available, many aspects of
this dataset warrant further analysis. For example, on the dif-
ferent aid volatilities of diﬀerent donors and more ﬁnely
focused on the diﬀerent aid subsectors. In addition more
detailed analysis of the lagged impact of aid disbursements will
become possible. Work also needs to be done analyzing the
diﬀerent impacts of volatility and sustained trends in volatility.
Is it really the case that a sustained and anticipated increase/
decrease in aid has no added impact over and above that of
aid itself? In spatial terms do donors tend to shift the aid bud-
get within regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, and to what
extent is aid volatility within a country correlated with that
of near neighbors? Related to this, are there regional spillovers
of aid and aid volatility, whereby the impacts are not limited
to one country, but involve multiplier eﬀects on adjacent coun-
tries? Finally we need more analysis of the impact of aid, sub-
sector aid, and associated volatility on speciﬁc targets.
Development economics used to be a data poor area, where
researchers strived heroically with inadequate observations
both in terms of time periods and variables. That is rapidly
changing and the CRS database is helping to make develop-
ment economics data rich, facilitating analysis and under-
standing.NOTES1. This includes using a value for lambda of seven (see Bulı´rˇ & Hamann,
2008 for clariﬁcation).
2. Or alternatively they will seek to protect those sectors which are of
most importance.
3. Bulı´rˇ and Hamann note that the Hodrick–Prescott ﬁlter may (i) create
spurious serial correlation in de-trended data and (ii) end-period obser-
vations have larger mean square errors than observations in the middle of
the sample (Cogley & Nason, 1995). Bulı´rˇ and Hamann also note that
there is relatively little diﬀerence between diﬀerent methods of identifying
residuals and that, e.g., a ﬁrst diﬀerence operator gave similar results to
those using the Hodrick–Prescott ﬁlter.4. With relatively little data on disbursements, we had problems in
estimating Tobit regressions for some individual countries.5. Being as the mean from the error terms are zero they are closely
related to the variance.6. Note our methodology is such that the sum of the sector error terms is
virtually identical to the error term for total aid (the correlation between
the square of these two terms is 1.0000, rounded up). Hence the diﬀerence
between the ﬁnal and ﬁrst columns is overwhelmingly due to the
covariance terms.
CONSEQUENCES OF AID VOLATILITY FOR MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND AID EFFECTIVENESS 737. This does not mean that the sum of the variances will increase as we
get an increased number of more ﬁnely deﬁned sub-categories as the
variances of these sub-categories will also decline, for a similar reason as
the mean declines. The variance is not standardized and will tend to be
smaller around a smaller mean.
8. From the regression of aid on a trend and trend squared term for each
individual country. Thus it is the square root of volatility.
9. The two positive correlations with multi-sector aid tentatively suggest
measurement errors with this variable, which might be thought to exist,
are not a substantial problem.
10. That is, the square root of the squared error term from the trend
regression as deﬁned in Table 1.
11. Where the lagged positive/negative error term takes a value equal to
the error term if that is positive/negative, otherwise it takes a value of zero.
The dependent variable being the error term is strictly speaking not
volatility. In particular it can take negative values. But the results give us
insights into the dynamic behavior of positive and negative volatility. Theterm asymmetric VAR has been used in the literature both in the sense we
are using it (Ferrucci, Jiminez-Rodriguez, & Onorante, 2010) and where
there are variable lag lengths (Cheng, Cheng, & Cheng, 2009; Keating,
2000). Our methodology is similar to Ferrucci, Jiminez-Rodriguez, and
Onorante.
12. This may seem to go against our previous speculation that the peak
in volatility is associated with debt aid. But the ﬁndings in Table 3, as well
as the correlations between the diﬀerent sector volatilities discussed earlier,
relate to aid switching within countries. It may still be that the increase in
debt aid stimulated aid switching between countries, even if this was only
short-term.
13. Essentially this would be the case even with a lag structure.
14. All of our results on the linkages of government aid with other
sectors point to it being closely related to PA and its inclusion as part of
social infrastructure in the CRS seems slightly misplaced.
15. The anticipated signs on the two volatility terms are explained in
Table 4.
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74 WORLD DEVELOPMENTAPPENDIX A. DATA DEFINITIONS
Sector aid (Source: CRS Database available at: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=CRS1)
Education Primary, secondary, and post-secondary education
Health General and basic health
Government(and civil society) Includes general activities (e.g., anti-corruption, judiciary) as well as conﬂict and
security areas
Other social sector Population, water supply, and sanitation and “other social infrastructure and services”
Social infrastructure The sum of education, health, other social sector, and government
Program assistance (PA) Un-earmarked contributions to the government budget; support for the implementation
of macroeconomic reforms (structural adjustment programs, poverty reduction
strategies); general program assistance (when not allocable by sector). Also includes
developmental food aid/food security assistanceIndustry Industry, mining, and construction
Other-production Agriculture forestry and ﬁshing, tourism, and trade policy and regulations
Infrastructure Includes transport, communications, energy, banking and ﬁnancial services, and
business services
Humanitarian Comprises emergency response, reconstruction relief and rehabilitation, and disaster
prevention
Multi-sector Multi-sector and cross cutting, includes general environmental protection
Debt Includes debt forgiveness, rescheduling, buy backs, etc.The target variables
Internet usage Internet users (per 100 people): people with access to the Worldwide Network. Source:
World Development Indicators (WDI) based on the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU)Mobile phones Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people): subscriptions to a public mobile
telephone service using cellular technology. Post-paid and prepaid subscriptions are
included. Source: WDI based on data from the ITUDeath rate Crude death rate indicates the number of deaths occurring during the year, per 1,000
population estimated at midyear. Source: WDISchool completion rate The total number of students in the last grade of primary school, minus the number of
repeaters in that grade, divided by the total number of children of oﬃcial graduation
age. Source: WDI based on UNESCO Institute for StatisticsNote: Further details on the deﬁnitions with respect to the CRS data can be found in www.oecd.org/document/32/0,3343,en_2649_33721_42632800_
1_1_1_1,00.html#Commitment.ScienceDirect
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
